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INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS:
THEIR REGULATION*
MANUEL F. COHEN**
Our world grows smaller as our technological achievements im-
prove the means of transportation and communication. A natural con-
sequence is a growing interaction and interdependence among all the
nations of the world.' An important contributing factor, which may be
considered both cause and effect, is the growing internationalization of
the world's money and capital markets. This has been accompanied by
an increasing number of mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures across
national boundaries among our business and financial institutions.
American businesses no longer confine their activities to the United
States; nor do they finance their growth solely by borrowing dollars at
home; rather, their managers scour the earth from London to Zurich
and other Continental markets, to the Bahamas and Panama, and more
recently to Asia, to augment their business capability and competitive
strength and to raise capital wherever interest rates are lowest or equity
capital is reasonably available. The development and growth of the
Euro-dollar market and, more recently, the beginnings of an Asia-
dollar market attest to this healthy development. But this is not a
one-way street. Our own shores have attracted business and financial
enterprises from around the world.
Certain foreign issuers have always sought capital in the United
States. The creation of the European Common Market, which illumi-
nated opportunities and challenges closer to home, naturally led Euro-
pean entrepreneurs to direct their attention and their resources to
Western Europe and its natural trading partners. Following an initial
delay, however, European investment in America has proceeded at a
greater rate of growth than United States investment in Europe.2 More
than ever, mixed underwriting syndicates of North American, South
0 This is an edited and slightly modified version of an address delivered on November
17, 1970 in Rome, Italy, at the Second Annual Trans-World Investment Company
Seminar sponsored by the Investment Dealers' Digest.
0 0 B.S., Brooklyn College; LL.B., Brooklyn Law School; Formerly Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
1 Recent dramatic illustrations may be found in the "attack" on the United States
dollar, President Nixon's New Economic Policy and the resulting immediate reaction in
the money and securities markets around the world. See BARRON'S, Oct. 11, 1971, at 9;
23 INr'L FlN. Naws SURVEY 269 (Sept. 1, 1971).
2 For a description of this changing investment flow, see G.W. Ball, Remarks before
Conference on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Washington, D.C.,
October 12, 1970.
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American, European and Asian investment bankers are joining to
market larger issues in international markets. Recent years have seen
investment and commercial bankers from abroad becoming members of
national securities exchanges in the United States, and otherwise assum-
ing important roles in venture capital and other investment banking
activities in North and South America. So, also, their American
counterparts have achieved an importance and prominence abroad.
And, as more foreign issuers are listing their securities on American
stock exchanges, many American companies are considering registra-
tion of their securities for trading on European and Asian stock
exchanges.
The net effect has been beneficial to all who have participated in
these developments. There can be little question that much credit is due
to the imaginative and enterprising bankers and businessmen who
ventured into strange and sometimes inhospitable communities. But,
no small measure of credit should be accorded those who recognized
that these developments would not long survive without a wider accep-
tance of, and increased confidence in, the world's securities markets as
relatively safe and attractive media for investment of household and
business savings. There has been a greater acceptance of the view that
quickened flow of investors' savings across national boundaries and the
channeling of those savings to finance the growth of industry through-
out the world could not be achieved without adequate disclosure of
corporate and other business information, and that the absence of ade-
quate controls and a free hand for the unscrupulous would inevitably
lead to the scandals that destroy necessary investor confidence. Unfortu-
nately, recent years have witnessed the collapse of certain international
investment media which but a few years earlier had been hailed, even
by the most sophisticated, as the greatest development of the century.3
Legislation, and other forms of regulation in most countries, is
usually concerned primarily with domestic markets and the interests
of citizens and residents. But all such legislation and regulation affects
international markets and the flow of capital across international boun-
daries. It is appropriate, therefore, to examine such activity in devel-
oped and developing areas of the world.
The purpose of this article is to examine the present regulatory
structure, with particular emphasis on the American experience. That
experience has been, and is now, the subject of intense study by the
agencies and institutions of the securities industry that provide the
3 See C. P.Aw, B. PAGE & G. HomsoN, Do You SiNcEELY WANT TO BE RiCH? (1971).
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framework within which it operates. 4 The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC- the Federal agency responsible for the regula-
tion of that industry)5, the Congress which exercises oversight of the
Commission," the various state securities authorities7 (important, albeit
sometimes overlooked, partners in the overall regulatory scheme), the
stock exchanges and other formal and informal self-regulators, and
other observers8 are examining and re-examining the current regulatory
structure and proposals for change. This author does not intend to
deal here with the problems which gave rise to this intense activity or
to discuss all of the specific areas under study. However, an attempt
will be made to highlight certain aspects of the activity on the Amer-
ican scene and, in a very limited way, to compare them with develop-
ments elsewhere.
Securities regulation in every country is, of course, a reflection of
national experience and needs. The past two decades have witnessed
the birth and dramatic development of new centers of industry, com-
merce and finance in the world and a real revolution in the world's
securities and capital markets- a revolution which seems to be ac-
celerating. In the United States, we saw a mammoth Special Study of
the Securities Markets9 which led to comprehensive amendments to
our federal securities laws in 1964- amendments which affected not
only our securities markets and those who operate within them, but also
dealt with difficult problems relating to non-United States issuers in the
securities of which a substantial interest is held by the American invest-
ing public.'
Studies of the growth of investment companies by the Wharton
School of Finance of the University of Pennsylvania" and by the SEC'2
suggested the need to re-examine the goals and tools reflected in the
4 See Wm. MC. MARTIN, Tin SEcuRrriEs MARKETs, Aug. 5, 1971 (submitted to the
Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange).
5See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9315 (Aug. 26, 1971).
6 See, e.g., Hearings on the Securities Markets Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (Aug. 2 &c 3, and Sept. 14 & 16, 1971).
7 See, e.g., Central Securities Administrators Council (Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Wisconsin), Statements of Policy (Aug. 31, 1971), reproduced in I CCH BLUE SKY
L. REP. 4851-61 (1971).
8 See, e.g., H. BARUCH, WALL SmEr: SECURITY RisK (1971); S. ROBBiNs, THE SEcuRrrEs
MAREErs (1966).
9 SEC, RFpoRT OF SPECIAL STUDY or SECURrnEs MA aKurs, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1963).
10 Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
11 WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDs, H.R.
REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
12 SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GRoWTH, H.R. REP.
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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regulatory framework enacted in 1940. They also pointed to the
dramatic institutionalization of our securities markets and to conse-
quent existing and potential problems. These studies led to additional
legislative proposals relating to investment companies which were
adopted after a four-year review and consideration by Congress.' 3 They
also led to a specific Congressional mandate to the SEC to study the
rapid institutionalization of investment and of the securities markets. 4
A comprehensive study was submitted to the Congress by the Commis-
sion in the Spring of 1971.15 The Congress, our investment community
and others are now studying that report and its implications.
These studies related in the main to developments flowing from
the rapid growth of our markets and of the financial institutions and
intermediaries that use them.'6 On a somewhat narrower plane, it be-
came clear a few years ago that the basic disclosure scheme with which
we have been living since the mid-1930's needed review and updating
- an activity which has been gaining considerable momentum in
Canada, Europe and other areas of the world. In 1967 the SEC initiated
a study which resulted in the publication of an excellent document
known popularly as the Wheat Report, after my former colleague,
Francis Wheat, who was responsible for implementing this initiative.1'7
Certain of its recommendations have already been adopted by the
Commission. Others have been under active consideration. In the midst
of these developments, the American Law Institute has appointed a
committee- whose long range goal is to attempt a codification of the
several federal securities statutes -a goal which, when achieved will,
according to the prospectus, better protect investors and promote more
efficient regulation of our securities and capital markets.
This wave of re-examination and reform, it must be emphasized,
is not confined to the United States. Canada has faced up to many of the
same problems with which we in the United States are struggling.'8 Our
northern neighbors have conducted a number of excellent studies and
13 Investment Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413.
14 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. 90-458, 82 Stat. 453.
15 SEC, INnruTONA INVEsToR STUDy REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
16 Another recent major legislative development is the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636), which created a quasi-governmental corpora-
tion to provide a measure of protection to investors faced with bankruptcy of their
broker-dealers. This protection will, of course, supplement any other form which may be
provided by the industry. It is believed to be the first such legislation in the free world.
17 Disclosure to Investors, A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies Under
the '33 and '34 Acts (1969). (Completion of this report announced in SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4963 (1969)).
18 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CANADAN COMf.TcrE ON MuTuAL FuNDs AND INvEsmTMNT
CoNTRAcTs (1969).
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enacted significant legislation in the corporate and securities areas in
the past few years.19 They too are facing unresolved issues, and, on
occasion, they arrive at different solutions. Thus, while we in the
United States have been struggling with the issue whether, and under
what circumstances, stock exchange member firms, as well as other
broker-dealers, should offer their securities to the public (a question
answered in the affirmative by the New York Stock Exchange),20 the
Moore Report, published by a committee representing the securities
industry in Canada, unequivocally recommended that such public
ownership be discouraged.2'
We have seen broad new securities statutes and corporate laws
adopted in consequence of other studies. In England, based upon the
studies of the Jenkins Committee,22 The Companies Act has been
revised and may be further amended. 23 An effective city panel admin-
istering a new Code relating to take-overs is in full operation in
London.24 South Africa, the Netherlands, Israel, France, Germany,
Austria, Greece, and the Scandinavian countries (just to name a few)
have overhauled or are studying their legislative controls over the secu-
rities markets and the distribution of securities. New systems of secu-
rities regulation and corporate law have, in fact, been enacted or are
under study in the Near and Far East, in Africa, in North and South
America, and in Europe.25
Many in the United States think that we have the best system; in
some areas, however, our system and our controls are not the most
sophisticated, the most imaginative or, necessarily, the most useful. The
19 For an example of recent legislation, see The Securities Act, Statutes of Ontario
C. 142 (1966).
20 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 8717 & 8734 (Oct., 1969).
21 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE REQUIREMENTS AND SOURCES OF CAPITAL
AND THE IMPLICATION OF NON-RESDENT CAPITAL FOR THE CANADIAN SECURITIES INDUSTRY,
at 146 (1970). There is, however, an ongoing debate within Canada. Quebec welcomes
and encourages public ownership. Ontario apparently opposes it. However, a special
committee has been established in Ontario to study this matter.
22 COMPANY LAw COMMITTEE, CMND. No. 1749 (1962).
23 Companies Act (1967).
24 The City Code on Take-Overs and Mergers, as revised, (April, 1969).
25 See, e.g., 1 Laws of Palestine c. 22 at 161 (Israel 1968); FINAL REPORT OF THE COM-
MISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO THE WORKING AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PRESENT COMPANY
LAw OF GHANA (1961); C. LEE, MOBILIZATION OF DOMESTIC CAPITAL (Korea); Legislative
Decree 608/1970 (Greece 1970); Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 6402 (France). Other
formerly unregulated jurisdictions, such as Bermuda, have also adopted new laws and
regulations.
In addition, a major revision of Japan's Securities and Exchange Laws became
effective in March, 1971. It is also expected that, early in 1972, there will be published in
Japan and the United States a volume reflecting the efforts of Japanese and American
scholars, discussing in detail comparative securities regulation in Japan and in the
United States.
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United States has learned and borrowed creative solutions to existing
and developing problems reached by other countries. We can learn
much more. This sharing of experience is a most desirable form of
international cooperation, an effort which has been encouraged, and
in many instances stimulated, by international bodies such as the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the
European Economic Commission (EEC), and the International Federa-
tion of Stock Exchanges. As yet, however, an internationally unified
system of regulation, while most desirable if not essential to continued
growth, is not in sight 2 6
THE FORMAT OF REGULATION
United States
There are certain basic differences between the regulatory scheme
in the United States and those adopted in other countries. There is
no codified Federal Corporation Law in the United States.27 Conflicts
of law questions still affect commerce and trade among the states. Each
of the fifty states has its own "provincial" corporate law governing the
corporations organized or domiciled within its boundaries.28 State cor-
poration statutes are, however, generally not concerned with problems
associated with securities markets. Consequently, while practically every
state has securities laws concerning the issuance, distribution and trad-
ing of securities within its borders, the principal regulatory statutes
governing the securities field are the Federal statutes, which apply in
every state when the jurisdictional means are used and supplement
local law.29
Another important characteristic of the regulation of capital and
securities markets in the United States is the unique blend of direct
regulation by the government and "self-regulation" by industry orga-
nizations specifically recognized by statute and vested with appropriate
authority. These include the national stock exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which is concerned with
securities trading away from the stock exchanges. The exchanges are
26 This is probably most true in the area of financial reporting, which, of course, is
the core of an effective disclosure scheme. See, e.g., PRIcE WATERHOUSE & Co., GumE FOR
THE READER OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (1971). See also however, a recent speech
by the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission in which he indicated the
probable publication early in 1972 of a set of "Standard Rules" for the regulation of
international mutual funds. William Casey, Current Problems in the Mutual Fund Area,
before The Twenty-third Annual Mutual Fund Sales/Management Conference, Washing-
ton, D.C., Oct. 18, 1971.
27 See R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 12 (3d ed. 1958).
281d. 13.
29 See Securities Act of 1933, § 5, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
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authorized to promulgate and administer rules and regulations to
govern the brokers and dealers who trade through the facilities of those
exchanges.80 They also have plenary power with respect to the listing of
securities for trading on the exchanges.31 The SEC, nonetheless, over-
sees the activities of these "self-regulators" and is vested, in certain
instances, with review authority and, in others, with authority to sup-
plement or supplant such self-regulation.3 2
In addition to the exchange markets and mechanisms, the secu-
rities industry has developed a vast, and, at least until fairly recently, an
amorphous over-the-counter market (OTC) where more speculative
unlisted securities (as well as seasoned and some listed) issues are traded
by broker-dealers, some of whom may also be members of an organized
stock exchange. In this OTC marketplace - essentially a vast electronic
network tied together by the telephone and by new and developing
computer systems - the NASD, a statutory (yet private) body, regulates
the broker-dealer community in a manner analogous to that followed
by a stock exchange.33 However, the self-regulatory authority of the
NASD does not include regulation of the issuers of listed or unlisted
securities traded over the counter. It does, however, exert certain influ-
ence through rules relating to the public quotation of and member
trading in, securities traded in the OTC market. The SEC has over-
sight responsibilities with respect to the activities of the NASD and
assumes the principal regulatory role with respect to issuers of secu-
rities traded only in over-the-counter markets.3 4
There is yet another class of broker-dealers in the United States
who are neither stock exchange members nor NASD members; they are
sometimes referred to as SECO members, who confine their activities
largely to the OTC markets.3 5 Since 1964, the SEC has been directed to
subject them to regulation comparable to that which the NASD exer-
cises over its membership. 6 This blend of governmental and quasi-
governmental regulation has some parallels in other countries; it seems
unique to the United States, however, in the depth of its development
and the extent to which government powers are vested in privately
managed and financed institutions.
30 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6, 19, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78s (1970).
311d.
32 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1970).
3 3 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DALm, RuLEs OF FAmr PRAc cE (CCH
1970).
34 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12, 13, 14, 15A, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781,
78m, 78n, and 78o-3 (1970).
35 SECO is an acronym for "SEC only" and refers to broker-dealers who have no
membership in either a stock exchange or the NASD.3 6Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(8)-(10), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8)-
(10) (1970).
[Vol. 46:264
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
Elsewhere
The contrast between our regulatory approach and the approach of
most countries, which, with certain notable and recently increasing
exceptions, 7 is found largely in each country's corporation law, is of
course a reflection of the legal system of each country and the somewhat
different economic development experienced by each. Until fairly
recent times, the history of European Continental corporate and secu-
rities law had been largely one of silence. Public shareholders were
once a relatively minor factor in the European securities markets. Until
the end of World War II, in fact, most industrial companies on the
Continent were closely-held or family corporations which, when in need
of capital, obtained necessary funds from private sources or certain
financial institutions rather than from the public. Debt rather than
equity financing was the common way of raising capital, and there was
little public equity investment even in large enterprises. Further, those
who did provide equity capital were usually in a position to obtain
whatever information they needed for informed investment decisions.
There was, therefore, little pressure to compel companies to make ade-
quate public disclosure about their operations and their management.
These conditions, together with other practices quaintly referred to as
"fiscal" in origin, also delayed the development of meaningful account-
ing and auditing procedures by independent professionals and the
creation of a skilled group of security and corporate analysts.
Since the end of World War II, however, a corporate revolution
has been taking place throughout the western world, a revolution
which has profound implications not only for those countries in which
it is occurring, but also for countries like the United States which have
traditionally advocated greater public disclosure of corporate informa-
tion. The spread of the multinational corporation has contributed to
the breakup of the traditional European family corporation and in-
creased the need for such companies to raise substantial amounts of
equity capital to grow and to compete effectively. More European
issuers have turned to the public to raise needed capital. The experi-
ence and success of Anglo-Saxon countries in creating investor
confidence, and thus attracting investor savings, have persuaded
entrepreneurs and bankers in other areas of the world that adequate
disclosure and fair dealing are prerequisites to successful tapping of
public funds. This has led to widespread reform throughout the world
to enhance disclosures to investors and otherwise to provide essential
investor protection.
'37 See note 25 supra.
1971]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
One of the most interesting developments - and perhaps one of
the most promising from the point of view of international cooperation
and integration - is the proposed European Company Law.3s Since
1959 much effort has been expended on this project. Although its adop-
tion in the near future is questionable, its realization now seems almost
within reach. The current draft reflects a harmonization of differing
political and social points of view. Its adoption should further en-
courage intra-European industrial and financial growth.
Change and improvement are by no means limited to Europe.
Japan has recently put into effect substantial amendments to its secu-
rities controls in the areas of increased disclosure, improved financial
presentation, regulation of take-overs and in other areas. Studies have
also been completed or are under way in Korea, Taiwan, Brazil,
Panama, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and other countries in Africa and in the
Near East.
AN UBIQUITOUS PROBLEM: ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE
These activities and achievements are reflections of the fact that all
countries have learned well the lesson that, if their capital markets are
to compete effectively, developed secondary markets are essential.
There is a growing recognition that adequate secondary markets are
achieved only by encouraging wider participation by the general public
in securities issues, directly or through financial intermediaries, a goal
which can be attained by inspiring greater investor confidence through
fuller disclosure and more effective regulation of the markets and those
who operate within them. It seems that (at least in the view of govern-
ments, interested private persons and organizations around the world)
investors do not yet enjoy adequate protection.3 9
There is another basic reason for reform. Adequate disclosure pro-
motes what the economists call "allocational efficiency." This means
that the ultimate effect of providing investors with information suffi-
cient to enable informed assessments of competing investment oppor-
tunities is to channel or attract available funds toward those firms that
will use them most efficiently. For this reason, at least in part, securities
38 For a pessimistic view of the prospects for such a law, see Rubin, The Inter-
national Firm and the National Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, 199
et seq. (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
39 In the United States, where it is generally considered that securities and market
regulation is most sophisticated, studies, new legislation and similar efforts have been
continuous since, at least, 1961. See, e.g., notes 9, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 17 supra.
If anything, the pace has quickened within the past year. Investigations or studies
are under way in at least two committees of the Congress, by the SEC, and by certain of
the self-regulatory bodies.
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and market regulation throughout the world has moved from a concern
limited to the prevention of fraud to include the discouragement of
inefficiency and the promotion of a healthy world economy.
In the United States, the SEC has continually explored methods
to improve disclosure to the investing public concerning securities of
domestic and foreign issuers traded in the United States. The 1964
amendments to the Federal securities statutes extended disclosure
requirements - theretofore limited to issues of securities traded on
exchanges or distributed to the public within the United States - to
other large companies whose securities are publicly traded by investors
in the United States.40 While these requirements in terms apply equally
to foreign and domestic issuers, the Commission was given exemptive
powers which enabled it to deal flexibly with foreign issues.41 The
serious problems of balancing American investor interest and protec-
tion, on the one hand, against concerns expressed by the issuers of those
securities and by their governments on the other, presented the Com-
mission with great difficulties in delineating the scope of the exemp-
tions which could or should be provided to foreign issuers. While the
Commission had, since its inception, wrestled with the problem of
securities originally issued outside the United States, the 1964 amend-
ments created something of a minor international crisis, or so it
seemed. 42 The Commission quickly learned that the regulation of busi-
ness enterprises with activities in more than one country is not easily
reduced to general and uniform rules and that, as a practical matter,
compromises must eventually be made between the regulatory interests
of the issuer's home country and those of the investor's domicile.
Of course, the problems of applying in one state the law of another
are not limited to the securities field. Similar difficulties arise, for
example, in the enforcement of antitrust law, product safety law, and
tax law. In each field, the critical challenge is how the host state can
best promote its own system of regulation, and further the particular
social and economic aims of its own people, while accommodating the
interests of enterprises domiciled in other states and seeking access to
markets and capital funds in the host country. This challenge must be
met if the citizens of the host state are to be assured of an opportunity
to invest in enterprises domiciled in other countries.
40 Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565, § 3(c) (1964), adding subsections (g)-(h) to section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and amending other disclosure provisions of the
statute.
41 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(3) (1971).
42 See, e.g., Warner, H.RL 6793-A Threat to U.S. Holders of Foreign Securities,
Fix. AN ArYsrs J. 148 (Sept.-Oct., 1964).
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Historically, the Commission's approach to solving these related
problems illustrates its willingness to reach reasonable compromises to
accommodate the needs, rights and practices of foreign issuers. For
approximately two years after the passage of the 1964 amendments, the
SEC granted a complete exemption to foreign issuers to provide time
for more extensive discussions with interested foreign parties and
further consideration of the appropriate impact of the legislation on
foreign issuers.43 The compromise that was finally reached provided
that registration of foreign securities would not be required if less than
300 shareholders of the foreign issuer resided in the United States (of a
world-wide total of at least 500 shareholders).44 In instances where the
foreign securities are not directly owned but, instead, are evidenced by
American Depository Receipts (ADR), registration, other than for the
public offering of the ADR, would not be required.45 However, indi-
vidual holdings of ADR are counted with holdings of share certificates
of the foreign issuer to determine whether the 300 shareholder limita-
tion applies in those cases where both direct shareholdings and ADR
are outstanding.46
As a further accommodation to foreign interests, foreign issuers
and certain insiders are exempted from the proxy disclosure and insider
trading restrictions applicable to the securities of domestic issuers.4 7
Furthermore, a foreign issuer that must register pursuant to section
12(g) of the 1934 Act is not required to comply with the ordinary
annual and periodic reporting provisions applicable to domestic com-
panies.48 A major accommodation has been made for foreign issuers in
that they are required to supply to the Commission only information
that: (1) is required to be made public by the issuer under the law of
the issuer's domicile, or (2) is made public by the issuer by virtue of
requirements of any foreign stock exchange on which its securities are
traded, or (3) is voluntarily distributed abroad by the issuer to its
foreign securities holders.49 Furthermore, the more rigorous American
accounting standards are not applied to documents filed by foreign
issuers. 10
Obviously, as more of the world's securities markets are interna-
43 17 CFR § 240.12(g)3-1 (1971).
44 17 CFR § 240.12(g)3-2(a)(1) (1971).
45 17 CFR § 240.12(g)3-2(c) (1971).
46 17 CFR §§ 240.12(g 3-2(e), 240.12(g)5-1(a) (1971); see also SEC Release No. 34-
8066, 32 Fed. Reg. 7845 et seq. (1967).
4732 Fed. Reg. 7845, 7846 (1967).
48 17 CFR § 240.12(g)3-2(b) (1971).
49 17 CFR § 240.12(g)3-2(b)(1)(i) (1971).
50 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-8068, 32 Fed. Reg. 7851 (1967).
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tionalized, each host country must balance its desire to protect local in-
terests against the burdens imposed upon foreign issuers. The solution
fashioned by the Commission has worked reasonably well even though
certain issuers, at least in one European country, have declined to meet
these minimal disclosure requirements - which they do fulfill, how-
ever, in the country of their own domicile. Apart from legal arguments
as to the extraterritoriality of the 1968 amendments, a policy argument
advanced has been that foreign issuers have no market for their shares
in the United States and should not, therefore, be subject to the
burdens and possibility of liability which filing might create. Without
attempting here to consider the validity of these arguments, it seems
certain that the need to attract investor interest in the United States,
and in the increasing number of countries, including the host states,
with disclosure standards comparable to those in the United States,
will eventually assure compliance with the substance of those require-
ments as a practical matter. The Commission's requirements for infor-
mation to protect American shareholders have been tailored to meet
the convenience of the foreign issuer, since only information released
publicly abroad need be submitted for inclusion in the public files of
the SEC. This is on the theory that the issuer has not sought a market
for its securities within the United States. Foreign issuers seeking a
listing on an exchange must meet the more rigorous requirements of
the exchange, and of the Commission, applicable when securities are
registered for trading on the particular exchange.
Protecting the Foreign Investor
The Commission has always felt that, when American securities
are sold abroad to foreigners, companies subject to its jurisdiction
should not discriminate against non-American investors by failing to
provide them with the information and other protections available to
American investors.51 Recently, important steps have been taken to
emphasize this policy and to assure that foreign investors are provided
with essentially the same protections accorded Americans. 52 Thus, in
June 1970, the Commission promulgated guidelines concerning the
applicability of the United States securities laws to the offer and sale
abroad of shares of United States open-end investment companies-
commonly referred to as mutual funds.53 Presumably, the Commission
51 See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 9, 1964), and Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8537 (Feb. 25, 1969).
52 SEC, 36TrH ANNUAL RFs. 188 et seq. (1970).
53 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5068, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8907,
Investment Company Act Release No. 6082 (June 23, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities
Act Release No. 5068].
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was persuaded that this action would indirectly benefit the American
securities market because the provision of adequate and timely infor-
mation (as required by American law and regulation) would deter any
loss of confidence in American companies in general, and investment
companies in particular. Such a loss of confidence might well follow
from the unavailability of adequate information which, in turn, could
trigger widespread share redemptions resulting in substantial losses to
both foreign and domestic investors. 4
In the policy statement which accompanied the announcement of
this action, the Commission restated its consistent position of not in-
sisting upon registration under the 1933 Act of securities offered exclu-
sively abroad by United States issuers where reasonable steps were
taken to assure (1) that the securities would not be sold to citizens or
residents of the United States, but rather to foreigners in accordance
with applicable local law, (2) that they would come to rest outside the
United States, and (3) that they would not flow back within a short
period of time.55 This position is not, in my judgment, based upon a
determination that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to go
beyond these guidelines, but rather upon the view that in most situa-
tions the registration provisions were designed primarily for the pro-
tection of Americans, particularly where there is no attempt to
distribute an issue to Americans or to invite them to create a substan-
tial market in the United States for foreign securities.5 6 It may be
that the anti-fraud provisions would apply to such activities. This is
not to minimize the difficult question whether courts in jurisdictions
outside the United States would accept jurisdiction to enforce those
statutory provisions. It is unlikely that the Commission would decline
to accept jurisdiction should an American issuer wish to register in
such circumstances.
However, with regard to a special class of issuer- open-end in-
vestment companies that are continually in registration and selling
shares to United States investors - the Commission stated that the
concurrent offering of such shares to foreign nationals abroad could
not be isolated from the continuing domestic offering and, therefore,
must be registered and comply with the disclosure requirements applic-
able to an offering in the United States.57 This means that offerees
54 SEC, 36TH ANNUAL REP. 139 (1970).
55 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5068 at 3 (June 23, 1970).
6 The Commission has also indicated, despite clear applicability of the statutory
jurisdictional standards, that it will not raise any question when American investment
bankers participate in (or, indeed, initiate and manage) offerings of securities abroad by
other American issuers even where no registration has been effected.
57 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5068 at 3 (June 23, 1970).
[Vol. 46:264
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
abroad must be provided with a prospectus which does not differ
materially from the prospectus used in the United States. The Commis-
sion has recognized, moreover, that the foreign prospectus should be
adapted to the customs and usages of the particular country in which
the securities are to be offered. Thus, not only should the prospectus be
printed in a language readily understood in that country but it should,
for instance, include a discussion of material tax consequences in that
country.
The SEC has not, however, required domestic investment com-
panies to oversee their foreign distributors directly, but rather has
suggested that such domestic companies should require their foreign
distributors to comply with reasonable standards by embodying such
standards in distribution contracts.5 8 Thus, by way of illustration, dis-
tribution agreements with foreign dealers should provide for delivery
of prospectuses to all purchasers outside the United States. Similarly,
where there are serious deviations by foreign dealers from conventional
practices followed by the issuer in the United States, the issuer or dis-
tributor should cancel his arrangements with such dealers. 9 Further-
more, to the extent possible, advertising and supplemental sales literature
utilized abroad should comply generally with the relevant standards
applied in the United States, allowing some flexibility in light of local
practice.00 Finally, the Commission has stated that it will not require a
foreign broker-dealer engaged in distribution abroad to register with
it as a broker-dealer when that foreign broker-dealer sells shares of
American investment companies solely to persons who are not nationals
or residents of the United States.6 '
CONCLUSION
The financial news each day offers additional support for the
recommendations made a few years ago, by the OECD and by the EEC,
that there be an international body to fix worldwide standards for
disclosure and control of capital markets . 2 The development of such
an international supervisory organization to overlook and to harmonize
the international securities markets, and to assure that they function for
the best interest of all, would be a welcome addition to current regula-
58 Id. at 2.
59 Id.
6o Id.
01 Id. at 6.
62 We have already noted that some progress has already been achieved and that we
may antidpate further efforts directed to this objective. See, e.g., discussion of the pro-
posed European Company Law at 272 supra; and the growth of cooperative international
regulation in the mutual fund area. See note 26 supra.
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tory efforts. As transportation and communication systems continue to
be refined, cooperative development of existing or new regulation
throughout the world, multiple international listings on stock ex-
changes, efforts to standardize the regulations of the various stock
exchanges throughout the world and to permit central clearing and
block trading all become more foreseeable. A good deal has already
been accomplished in the development of an "informal international
law," based, at least in part, on the use of standard forms of contract,
international arbitration provisions and international conventions un-
related to the law of a particular country. Additionally, the Interna-
tional Federation of Stock Exchanges, which numbers among its
membership stock exchanges around the world, has published excellent
proposals for improved disclosure and encouraged their adoption by
member stock exchanges. The elimination of local restrictions on do-
mestic purchases of foreign securities as well as upon foreign purchases
of domestic securities would be a giant step in the direction of a
unified practice.
The changes already affected by national and multinational cor-
porations, and others now underway in corporate affairs and securities
markets here and abroad will, in coming years, have as great an impact
on the world's capital markets as did the passage of our securities laws,
and similar actions in other countries, more than thirty years ago.
